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Abstract: The last two decades have witnessed a debate concerning whether
Aristotle's syllogistic is a system of deductive discourses having epistemic 
import exemplifying an Aristotelian theory of deductive reasoning and justifying 
the claim that Aristotle is the founder of logic taken as the scientific study 
of proof or whether, on the contrary, the syllogistic is a system of true 
propositions of a theory of classes justifying the claim that Aristotle is the 
founder of logic is taken as the scientific study of formal relations such as 
class inclusion. An epistemically-oriented interpretation has been contending 
with an ontically-oriented interpretation. This debate should not be confused 
with the related issue, which is partly terminological, of whether logic should 
be construed as an organon and epistemic metascience of reasoning or as an ontic 
science on a par with but antecedent to, and more abstract than, other sciences. 
The present nontechnical, nonpolemical, expository essay attempts to show that 
approaching Aristotle's logical writings from a standpoint informed by knowledge 
and appreciation of the scientific and philosophical achievements of Aristotle's 
predecessors, especially Socrates, Plato and the Academic mathematicians, 
(rather than from the standpoint of the logicistic, Frege-Russell paradigm) will 
make the epistemically-oriented interpretation more plausible than the 
ontically-oriented one. The epistemically-oriented interpretation permits the 
birth of logic as epistemic metascience to be located with Aristotle while 
deferring the birth of logic as ontic science to the modern period. In 
contrast, the ontically-oriented interpretation permits the birth of logic as 
ontic science to be located with Aristotle while deferring the birth of logic as 
epistemic metascience to the modern period.
1. Demonstrative Proofs: The Subject-Matter of Prior Analytics. Aristotle
himself tells us in Prior Analytics that his subject is anodeixis 
(demonstration, proof, or demonstrative proof). Historians of mathematics date 
the origins of the practice of demonstrative proof centuries before Aristotle. 
Predating Aristotle by decades was one of his favorite examples, a proof that 
the side of the square and its diagonal cannot both be measured in a whole 
number of units of a fixed length. This remarkable result concerning ideal (or 
abstract) geometrical figures has no meaningful analogue in the practical 
experience of engineers, surveyors, and carpenters. Given any material square, 
a sufficiently small unit can be found which will measure in whole numbers of 
lengths both the side and the diagonal--within the limits of experimental 
accuracy.
One ancient proof of this theorem uses as a premise the proposition now 
known as the Pythagorean Theorem, which had itself been proved several decades 
earlier yet. The theorem in question, that the side of the square is 
incommensurable with the diagonal, is a theorem of geometry about square figures 
but it is closely related to a theorem of arithmetic about square numbers, viz. 
the proposition that no square number is double of another square number, in 
other words that no two square numbers, no matter how large, are in the ratio of 
one- to- two.
Pairs of square numbers can be found in a ratio closer to the ratio of one- 
to-two than any given ratio, no matter how close. We can get pairs of square 
numbers as close as we want to the chosen ratio but we can never reach it. The 
practical experience of continual frustration in trying to find a square whose 
double is also a square is reflected in and predictable from this theorem, which 
has received attention from many philosophers including Pascal, Descartes and 
Leibniz.
The Double Square Number Theorem, if I may call it that, was of course 
known to Plato, as we learn from the Theatetus. It is in sharp contrast to a 
geometrical theorem which also must have certainly been known to Plato. I refer 
here to the proposition that every square figure is double of a square figure, a 
result easily deducible from results explicitly mentioned in the Meno. The 
Double Square Number Theorem, that no square number is double of a square 
number, contrasts with the Double Square Figure Theorem, that every square 
figure is double of a square figure.
I hope that you will excuse me for reminding you of these elementary but 
representative facts about the state of the art of demonstration before 
Aristotle. The interpretation that we put on a work is colored by what we know, 
by what we have in mind when we read it, and by what we could imagine ourselves 
to be concerned with were we to change places with the, author. I do not see how 
it could be possible to understand the Analytics without having the experience 
of knowing geometrical and arithmetic theorems, without being struck (perhaps 
stunned would be a/ better word) by the cogency of demonstrative proof, and 
without some awareness of the historical situation involving demonstrative 
proof. Interpretations of Aristotle's syllogistic not informed by these 
prerequisites seem to find Aristotle's syllogistic to be alienating, 
formalistic, simplistic, narrow, useless, labored, and uninspiring and they seem 
to suffer the same faults themselves.
In order to understand what study Aristotle was proposing to undertake it 
is necessary to have some familiarity with the subject-matter of that study as
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it had become manifest at that time to Aristotle and to Aristotle's 
contemporaries, the persons to whom Aristotle addressed the Prior Analytics. 
What a writer chooses to say about a subject-matter depends to some extent on 
what that writer thinks the reader already knows or believes.
Euclid's Elements can provide us with a good impression of what examples of 
proofs were available to Aristotle's readership. Unfortunately, the Elements 
were written after Prior Analytics and it is therefore possible that its style 
of presentation of proof was influenced by the theory of proof found in Prior 
Analytics. Nevertheless, the propositions that are proved in the Elements had 
for the most part already been proved before Aristotle undertook his study of 
proof and, as far as we know, the proofs that had been given before Aristotle's 
study resemble in essential ways those in Euclid.
Not only had most of the propositions proved in Euclid's Elements been 
proved before Aristotle's time, it is also the case that there were 
axiomatizations of geometry already available in the Academy. It is altogether 
possible that a project of axiomatizing geometry was underway in the Academy 
while Aristotle was there. Be that as it may, there was a considerable body of 
proofs available to Aristotle as data for his study.
The function of a proof, of course, is production of knowledge. Every 
proposition which is proved to a given person is known to be true by that 
person. This function of proof is what makes demonstrative science possible. 
Proof has the remarkable capacity to bring about unwavering and stable belief in 
cases where we would otherwise be condemned to suspended judgement or at best to 
an attenuated moral certainty; proof makes it possible for us to form 
responsible belief when otherwise belief, if achieved at all, would be 
irresponsible. How could you decide whether every number which is twice a 
square is non-square? By trying out the first few squares, 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, we 
merely illustrate to ourselves the experimental import of the proposition. In 
some cases an expectation may be engendered, but this expectation becomes hedged 
once we realize that it could be upset by one counterexample.
The capacity for a proof to establish belief is closely related to its 
capacity to extinguish doubt. Certain propositions seem to have the curious 
capacity to raise doubts and to create tension. For example, people that are 
not used to the following proposition tend to doubt it when they encounter it: 
every triangle having the square on one of its sides equal in area to the sum of 
the squares on the other two sides is right-angled. This, of course, is the 
converse of a corollary to the Pythagorean Theorem and it is proved in Euclid 
immediately after the Pythagorean Theorem. The Pythagorean Theorem enables us 
to infer something about the sides of a triangle given information about its 
angles; the Converse Pythagorean Corrollary enables us to infer something about 
the angles given information about the sides.
2. The Aristotelian Revolution: A Radical Shift of Focus. The practice of
demonstrative proof evidently first took root in Ionia during or shortly before 
the time of Thales, perhaps a little more than two centuries before Aristotle 
undertook its study. The taking root of this practice was followed by a 
flowering of learning, both scientific and humanistic, and it is impossible to 
conceive of the scientific development without demonstrative proof. How the 
practice came about we do not know. We do not know whether it was sudden or 
gradual. We do not know whether it was largely due to one or a small number of 
geniuses or whether it was essentially a communal development. Shifting our
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attention from the historical origin of the practice to the acquisition of it by 
individuals today leaves us just as short of answers.
Learning to follow demonstrative proofs is a tricky business. Despite an 
almost total absence of insight into how it is done, many of us manage to do it. 
Discovering new demonstrative proofs is another remarkable skill that many of 
us learn to do quite well.
Little has been written on these two epistemic skills despite the fact that 
discovering new proofs is an activity that can yield deep inner satisfaction, 
feelings of accomplishment and self-worth, feelings of competence and feelings 
of community with other, human beings--not to mention the aesthetic enjoyment 
involved. Following a demonstrative proof has similar benefits which, I might 
add, seem to be intimately related to the acquisition of knowledge. Others have 
pointed out these things as well as the further point that following a proof 
feels a lot like discovering a proof but being helped along by hints. The 
gratifications achieved in the course of following and creating proofs rank high 
among the joys of the intellectual life. There is a special happiness that 
accompanies the search for a proof when the search lasts a long time, say months 
or years. It has been referred to as a feeling of being pregnant with a 
scientific child. My own suspicion is that the impressions of freshness, hope, 
liveliness and dignity that we get from our study of ancient Greek thought is 
due in part to the benefits of demonstrative proof.
In the course of creating or absorbing a demonstration one's attention is 
focused on the subject-matter, be it geometrical, arithmetic, set-theoretic, or 
what-not. Not only is the language in use transparent, to use Polanyi's apt 
phrase, but also out of focus and maybe out of the field of vision altogether 
are the propositions and inferential connections involved in the demonstration. 
Plato, Aristotle and Proclus have made scattered remarks about the demonstrative 
or apodictic experience. I should like to emphasize that I am using the word 
'experience' as it is used in normal English and not as it is used by the so- 
called empirically-oriented philosophers who limit the term to sensation. The 
point that I am getting to about the activity of creating or absorbing an actual 
demonstration is this: in the course of this activity the mind is intensely
focused, perhaps riveted, on the subject-matter. Try it out. The Meno was 
written by someone who knows what it is to do a demonstration.
An early step in the founding of a science of proof involves shifting one's 
focus from the subject-matter to the process of thought involved in the 
demonstration. When a person first starts to attempt to study demonstration 
itself there are many vertiginous moments, there are moments when one loses 
one's grip on one's thoughts, it is something like trying to observe the series 
of mouth positions involved in pronouncing a word, or perhaps trying to observe 
the spectrum of leg-positions involved in jumping a hurdle. These analogies are 
not quite apt. Another analogy that comes to mind is studying the motion of a 
tool in a process instead of focusing on the task, for example in the process of 
sweeping the sidewalk instead of attending to the debris being swept attend 
instead to the motion of the broom.
There are several other steps involved in the process of moving from a 
study of a given subject-matter, say geometry, to a study of proofs about that 
subject-matter and, more generally, to a study of proofs themselves. I call 
this event or process the Aristotelian Revolution.
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Another step is the discovery of abstract, timeless, static, entities 
underlying the individual concrete, temporal, dynamic, processes of 
demonstrative proof. When we experience proofs we may be said to be involved in 
a proof-performance or proof-token as opposed to an abstract proof or proof- 
type. An abstract proof is an allographic artifact like a poem or a song which 
admits of individual, concrete, temporal performances; allographic artifacts are 
contrasted with the so-called autographic artifacts such as paintings. 
Historians of mathematics, including Morris Kline, have credited the Greeks with 
making mathematical science possible by discovering how to treat numbers and 
geometrical figures as abstractions related to but apart from concrete 
multitudes and concrete shaped-things. The analogous step in regard to proof 
may safely be credited to Aristotle; in any case the Prior Analytics is the 
earliest known work which treats proofs as timeless abstractions amenable to 
investigation similar to the investigations already directed toward numbers and 
geometrical figures. These points and other very closely related points have 
been made by other writers including Robin Smith and James Gasser. A person who 
has read Plato and who has experienced first-hand some of the mathematics done 
in the Academy is not likely to read the Prior Analytics without being struck by 
Aristotle's hypostasization of proof, provided of course that the person is 
alert to the issue.
It was already obvious before Aristotle that a single proof typically 
involved several concepts (or terms), that besides the conclusion (or 
proposition being proved) there were premises whose truth needed to be 
established before the proof could be made, that there are still further 
propositions besides the premises and the conclusion, and that there are two 
contrasting kinds of proof; on one hand we have direct proofs such as Euclid's 
proof of the Pythagorean Theorem which so-to-speak builds up to the conclusion 
and on the other we have indirect proofs such as the usual proof of the Square 
Incommensurability Theorem which so-to-speak derives an impossibility from the 
supposition of the opposite of the conclusion. But some things that seemed to 
be obvious were found by Aristotle to be false. For example, examination of the 
proofs in Euclid, say, gives the distinct impression that many if not all proofs 
involve manipulation of the entities that the conclusions are about; proofs in 
geometry seem to involve manipulation of geometrical figures and proofs in 
arithmetic seem to involve the manipulation of numbers. Aristotle makes the 
point himself. Even today discussion of mathematical proof is pervaded by 
constructional language, sometimes avowedly metaphorical, but sometime avowedly 
literal. Aristotle's theory of proof has no room for manipulation of subject- 
matter. For Aristotle the only epistemic activities involved in proof, once the 
premises are secured, are inferring (or applying rules of inference), assuming 
(or making suppositions) , and more or less clerical activities such as 
remembering and recognizing.
Many later thinkers including Kant accepted the existence of reasoning in 
accord with Aristotle's theory but they could not accept the view that 
Aristotle's theory was exhaustive. Put another way, they accepted Aristotelian 
reasoning but they considered it only a species of a wider genus which also 
includes "synthetic" or "constructional" reasoning; in particular geometrical 
reasoning and arithmetical reasoning were thought of as involving constructions 
alien to Aristotle's purely inferential, nonmanipulational view. Even to this 
day intuitionistic followers of Brouwer hold that arithmetic proof involves 
constructions.
According to some logicians, including Beth, the most important discovery
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by Aristotle was the idea that proof consists in inference of consequences of 
premises known to be true. This has been called the Truth-And -Consequence
Conception of proof. This view recognizes that the inferential aspect of proof, 
the deducing of logical consequences from premises, is separable from the 
material aspect, the epistemic apprehension of the truth of the premises. It 
allows for the universalization of the inferential aspect, the idea that 
inference is one and the same regardless of subject-matter however much the 
material aspect may vary from one subject-matter to another. In other words, it 
opens the door to formal logic.
It is the truth-and-consequence conception of proof that underlies 
Aristotle's distinction between demonstrations and deductions, i.e. between 
apodeixis and sullogismos. A deduction makes evident that its conclusion
follows logically from its premise-set. A proof is a deduction whose premises 
are known to be true. Plato may have something like this distinction in the 
Republic when he points out that knowledge of the theorems of geometry depends 
on knowledge of the basic hypotheses.
As Aristotle himself tells us, every demonstration is a deduction but not 
every deduction is a demonstration. In Prior Analytics Aristotle discusses 
deductions in general much more than just proofs per se: although his goal is 
understanding of proof, the species, he finds that the goal requires 
understanding of the genus, deduction.
The word argumentation has been used to refer to the genus that has the 
class of deductions as a species. Every deduction is an argumentation and but 
not every argumentation is a deduction. An argumentation may be thought of as 
composed of a premise-set, a conclusion and a discourse (or chain of reasoning) 
which may or may not be fallacious. It has been pointed out by other writers 
that the word argumentation is a convenient translation for logos in some but 
not all of its occurrences in Plato and Aristotle.
The entity that we refer to as the Euclidean proof of the Pythagorean 
Theorem is clearly an argumentation. Its premises include several axioms and 
definitions and perhaps also some previously established propositions. Its 
conclusion is the Pythagorean Theorem, the proposition that in every right 
triangle the square on the hypotenuse is equal in area to the combination of the 
squares on the other two sides. The discourse or chain of reasoning is 
described by a relatively long text which is informally said to include among 
other things an explanation of how to cut the square on the hypotenuse into two 
rectangles which may be shown to equal respectively the other two squares. In 
typical cases the chain of reasoning strikes us as being much longer than the 
combination of the premises and the conclusion and moreover the chain of 
reasoning has a semantic character radically different from that of a set of 
propositions or a single proposition. Propositions have a semantically static 
character in that they do not explain or report a process of reasoning. A chain 
of reasoning on the other hand may be said to be a recipe for carrying out a 
mental process. To use Austin's terminology, the premises and conclusion of a 
demonstration are expressed by declaratives whereas the chain of reasoning must 
be expressed by a performative. In order to follow a proof it is necessary to 
carry out the processes set forth in the chain of reasoning. Reading a proof- 
text with understanding, requires reader participation to a much greater extent 
and in much more striking way than does reading a story. Reading a proofs text 
is not a spectator activity. A proof makes a prediction that the reader must 
verify in order to understand the proof.
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3. Aristotle's Theory of Deduction: Direct and Indirect Deductions. The word 
argument has several meanings in normal English but in logic it has a technical 
meaning that it rarely takes elsewhere. In logical discussions an argument is a 
two-part system composed of a set of propositions called its premises and a 
single proposition called its conclusion. There are two very elementary points 
to be made: an argument is not a molecular proposition because its constituent 
propositions are not combined by connectives into one, a typical proof contains 
a non-propositiónal discourse or chain of reasoning (and thus is not an 
argument). Every proof contains an argument in the sense that it has a premise- 
set and a conclusion but it is not itself an argument per se. The difference 
between containing an argument and being an argument is important.
Mates has alleged that the Stoics thought that demonstrations were 
arguments in this exact sense. Mates also alleged that the Stoics used the word 
logos as a techical term in logic having the exact sense that we have attached 
above to argument. If your geometry teacher asked you to do a demonstration of 
the Pythagorean Theorem and you turned in a set of geometric propositions with 
the Pythagorean Theorem adjoined, you should expect an exasperated teacher. The 
teacher wants an argumentation which includes a chain of reasoning, not just an 
argument, which per se necessarily lacks any inferential recipe.
Just as propositions divide exclusively and exhaustively into true and 
false, arguments divide exclusively and exhaustively into valid and invalid, and 
argumentations divide exclusively and exhaustively into cogent and noncogent. 
In order for a proposition to be true it is necessary and sufficient for it to 
"correspond to fact". In order for an argument to be valid it is necessary and 
sufficient for its premise-set to logically imply its conclusion, or, what is 
the same thing, for the negation of the conclusion to be logically incompatible 
with the premises. According to Mates, the Stoics preferred to define validity 
in terms of incompatibility rather than implication. In order for an 
argumentation to be cogent it is necessary and sufficient for its chain of 
reasoning to make evident that its premise-set logically implies its conclusion. 
It is well worth the effort to note that propositions, arguments, and 
argumentations form three mutually exclusive ontological categories and that 
category mistakes ensue when a property appropriate to one category is 
attributed to something in another. It is incoherent to say that a proposition 
is valid or invalid, or cogent or noncogent. It is incoherent to say that an 
argument is true or false, or cogent or noncogent. Likewise it is incoherent to 
say that an argumentation is true or false, or valid or invalid. It goes 
without saying that the last three remarks apply only when the words are used in 
the senses here defined. It is also worth noting, as is rarely done, that the 
word proposition in English is often used in senses other than that being used 
here and that the word 'argument' is almost never used outside of logic in this 
sense. In fact there are many logicians who never use it in this sense, e.g. 
Lukasiewicz and Tarski.
The word deduction is used in English in several categories two of which 
are relevant to this discussion. In the first place, deduction is an epistemic 
process of extracting information that is implicit in given information. In
logic this usage is sharpened up a bit and we say that deduction is the 
epistemic process of coming to know that a given single proposition is logically 
implicit in a given set of propositions. In other words, deduction amounts to 
the process by which we determine that a given argument is valid. In this sense 
of the word, ’deduction' is a process noun which does not pluralize. No 
occurrence of the pluralized word has this sense. Aristotle's theory of
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deduction, to the extent that it was understood, dominated thinking on the
subject until the 1920s and even then what became clear was that it needed
supplementation, not that it needed correction.
In the second sense, a deduction is a result of an application of the 
process of deduction. In logic this sense is sharpened in various ways, and the 
variations can be important. Here a deduction is a cogent argumentation, an 
argumentation whose chain of reasoning makes evident that its conclusion is 
implied by its premise-set. Aristotle's theory of deduction is an account of 
how deductions are constructed or, what is the same thing given the context, how 
chains of reasoning are constructed.
According to Aristotle's theory there are certain simple valid arguments 
that can be seen to be valid without recourse to other valid arguments, in other 
words there are certain cases where the conclusion can be deduced from the 
premise-set immediately without the interposing of intermediate conclusions. 
Today inferences in such cases are callèd immediate inferences, where
'immediate' is taken in its etymological sense of "without intermediation" and 
not in any temporal sense.
Aristotle's theory of deduction recognizes two ways of coming to see that a 
given conclusion follows from given premises and accordingly he recognizes two 
types of deductions, the direct deductions and the indirect deduction. A direct 
deduction is obtained by chaining together immediate inferences in a sequence 
starting with given premises and ending with the conclusion. An indirect 
deduction is obtained by chaining together immediate inferences in a sequence 
starting with given premises augmented by the opposite of the conclusion and 
continuing until reaching a proposition whose opposite has already been reached.
The fact that Aristotle recognized the distinction between logical 
implication and logical deduction paralleling the distinction between truth and 
knowing attests to his penetrating analysis of proof. The fact that he divised 
a theory of deduction as part of his theory of proof is already sufficient to 
secure his reputation as the father of logic.
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